2008-03 Archives

31-03-2008 21:21:55

[FreeBSD] Configuration Wifi / WPA sous FreeBSD 7.0

Aujourd'hui j'ai décidé de supprimer la pauvre rallonge de 50m qui relit le salon à ma chambre en reliant le tout par wifi.
Le point d'accès est une LiveBox et j'ai pris comme carte réseau une D-Link DWL-G520 avec un chipset Atheros.
Tout d'abord il faut bien penser a compiler son noyau avec le device ath pour supporter les chipsets Atheros. Ensuite j'ai configurer mon interface ath0 en modifiant le /etc/rc.conf et en y mettant :

ifconfig_ath0="ssid Livebox-A610"
ifconfig_ath0="WPA DHCP"
Comme vous l'aurez compris, "Livebox-A610" est le ssid de ma box et j'ai ensuite activé le cryptage WPA et demandé une IP par DHCP.
Pour supporter le WPA, j'ai ensuite installé le port security/wpa_supplicant et j'ai créé un fichier /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf contenant les informations suivantes :
ap_scan=1 ####I have tried ap_scan=2 more details below 

Les 5 1ere options sont des options de bases, j'ai juste configuré le network en y mettant mon SSID, en indiquant le type de cryptage, ici WPA-PSK et indiqué ma clé au champs psk=.

On redémarre les interfaces avec un petit /etc/rc.d/netif restart et si tout est bien configuré on doit visualiser des informations du genre :
ath0: flags=8843 metric 0 mtu 1500
        ether 00:1c:f0:9d:3e:4a
	inet netmask 0xffffff00 broadcast
	media: IEEE 802.11 Wireless Ethernet autoselect (OFDM/48Mbps)
	status: associated
        ssid Livebox-A610 channel 6 (2437 Mhz 11g) bssid 00:18:02:82:a3:76
        authmode WPA privacy ON	deftxkey UNDEF TKIP 2:128-bit TKIP 3:128-bit
	txpower 31.5 bmiss 7 scanvalid 60 bgscan bgscanintvl 300
        bgscanidle 250 roam:rssi11g 7 roam:rate11g 5 protmode CTS burst
        roaming MANUAL
Pour ma part j'ai eu juste ensuite a modifier ma conf de PF pour modifier l'interface externe sur ath0 et toutes mes redirections ont marchées niquelles :)

Posté par cloud | permalien | dans : FreeBSD

24-03-2008 12:50:51

[OpenSource] Encoder vos vidéos avec Avidemux2

Besoin d'encoder un film dans n'importe quel format ? Avidemux2 est la pour vous aider. Un GUI convivial et plutot simple qui permet d'encoder dans de nombreux formats dont celui de la PSP par exemple.

Url du site : http://fixounet.free.fr/avidemux/

Posté par cloud | permalien | dans : OpenSource

17-03-2008 20:28:20

Chroot du FTPD de FreeBSD

Le minimum de sécurité que l'on souhaite pour son serveur FTP est de chrooter ses utilisateurs. Nous allons donc voir ici comment le mettre en place sur le serveur FTP d'origine de FreeBSD.

La méthode est tres simple. Tout d'abord nous allons mettre dans le fichier /etc/ftpchroot le nom des utilisateurs ou les groupes que l'on souhaite chrooter. Par exemple pour chrooter "user1" et tout le groupe "users" on aura dans le re´pertoire /etc/ftpchroot :

Le @ sert juste a dire que c'est un groupe.

Ensuite nous allons recompiler le serveur ftpd en activant le chroot de la maniere suivante :
#cd /usr/src/libexec/ftpd
#export FTPD_INTERNAL_LS=yes
#make clean; make; make install
Et voila c'est terminé, votre serveur ftpd est chrooté :)

Le lien du tuto d'origine est ici.

Posté par cloud | permalien | dans : FreeBSD, Security

12-03-2008 22:41:16


Voici un petit site qui m'a fait bien rire. Il est rempli de code marrant :)

Petit exemple sympa :


#include "morningRoutine.hpp"
#include "you.hpp"
#include "alarm.hpp"
#include "shower.hpp"
#include "coffee.hpp"


while( !You.late() )
   Alarm.snooze(  );

You.curse( FUCK_IM_LATE );

You.run( TO_SHOWER ); 

// as long as we're not REALLY late, might as well wait for the water to heat up
while( Water.hot() == NOT_YET && !You.veryLate())  
  You.wait( IMPATIENTLY );

if( You.veryLate() && Water.hot() == NOT_YET ) // we are now very late and can't 
{                                              // wait anymore
   You.curse( FUCKIT );
   You.curse( GODDAMNIT_ITS_COLD );
   You.shrinkage( true ); // happens to the best of us
   You.latherRinse();     // forget the repeat, you're late!

You.dryOff( QUICKLY );


bool skipShave = ( (You.stubble() <= BABY_FACE)                        ||
                   (You.late() && You.stubble() <= FIVE_OCLOCK_SHADOW) ||
                   (You.veryLate() && You.stubble() <= WOLFMAN ) );
if( !skipShave )
   while( You.stubble() >= BABY_FACE || You.bleeding() <= FIVE_PLACES )
      if( You.shave() == NICKS_AND_CUTS )
         You.curse( MOTHER_FUCKER );
         You.bleeding( You.bleeding + 1 );            
   if( You.bleeding() >= FIVE_PLACES )
      You.curseSomeMore( SON_OF_A_BITCH );

You.putOn( SHIRT, QUICKLY );
You.putOn( PANTS, QUICKLY );

if( You.wangDamage() )
   while( true )
      You.curse( FUCKER );   // there is no recovery from this

if( You.shittyJob() )
   You.putOn( TIE, SLOPPY);


You.skipBreakfast( SNAG_DONUT_AT_WORK );

// no time for coffee unless your pot made it for you
if( You.smart() )
   You.caffineBuzz( true );
   if( coffee.temperature() == COLD )
      You.spit( LIKE_CHEAP_WHORE );
      You.curse( FUCKING_MACHINE );      
   You.drinkCoffee( LATER_AT_WORK );
   You.caffineBuzz( false );

drivingType_e howAmIDriving = SHITTY;  // temporary value for compiler
if( You.caffineBuzz() )
   if( !You.veryLate() )
      howAmIDriving = VERY_FAST;     
      howAmIDriving = OUTTA_MY_WAY_FUCKERS;  // speed limit? What speed limit

else // no caffine buzz
   howAmIDriving = ASLEEP_AT_THE_WHEEL;

You.drive( TO_WORK, howAmIDriving );

// the morning routine is now complete.

Have Fun !

Posté par cloud | permalien | dans : Fun / Divers

10-03-2008 18:20:34

[FreeBSD] man security

Voici un man bien sympatique que je ne connaissais pas : man security . Il traite de la sécurité de base sous FreeBSD, les DoS, la compromission de comptes, et l'acces root.
Le voici dans son intégralité :

SECURITY(7)        FreeBSD Miscellaneous Information Manual        SECURITY(7)

     security -- introduction to security under FreeBSD

     Security is a function that begins and ends with the system 
administrator.  While all BSD multi-user systems have some inherent security, 
the job of building and maintaining additional security mechanisms to 
keep users ``honest'' is probably one of the single largest undertakings 
of the sysadmin.  Machines are only as secure as you make them, and 
security concerns are ever competing with the human necessity for 
     UNIX systems, in general, are capable of running a huge number of 
simultaneous processes and many of these processes operate as servers -- 
meaning that external entities can connect and talk to them.  As 
yesterday's mini-computers and mainframes become today's desktops, and as 
computers become networked and internetworked, security becomes an ever 
bigger issue.

     Security is best implemented through a layered onion approach.  In 
a nutshell, what you want to do is to create as many layers of security 
as are convenient and then carefully monitor the system for intrusions.

     System security also pertains to dealing with various forms of 
attacks, including attacks that attempt to crash or otherwise make a system 
unusable but do not attempt to break root.  Security concerns can be 
split up into several categories:

           1.   Denial of Service attacks (DoS)

           2.   User account compromises

           3.   Root compromise through accessible servers

           4.   Root compromise via user accounts

           5.   Backdoor creation

     A denial of service attack is an action that deprives the machine 
of needed resources.  Typically, DoS attacks are brute-force 
mechanisms that attempt to crash or otherwise make a machine unusable by 
overwhelming its servers or network stack.  Some DoS attacks try to take advantages 
of bugs in the networking stack to crash a machine with a single 
     The latter can only be fixed by applying a bug fix to the kernel.
     Attacks on servers can often be fixed by properly specifying 
options to limit the load the servers incur on the system under adverse 
     Brute-force network attacks are harder to deal with.  A 
spoofed-packet attack, for example, is nearly impossible to stop short of cutting 
your system off from the Internet.  It may not be able to take your 
machine down, but it can fill up Internet pipe.

     A user account compromise is even more common than a DoS attack.  
Many sysadmins still run standard telnetd(8), rlogind(8), rshd(8), and 
ftpd(8) servers on their machines.  These servers, by default, do not 
operate over encrypted connections.  The result is that if you have any 
moderate sized user base, one or more of your users logging into your system 
from a remote location (which is the most common and convenient way to 
log in to a system) will have his or her password sniffed.  The attentive 
system administrator will analyze his remote access logs looking for 
suspicious source addresses even for successful logins.

     One must always assume that once an attacker has access to a user
account, the attacker can break root.  However, the reality is that 
in a well secured and maintained system, access to a user account does 
not necessarily give the attacker access to root.  The distinction is 
important because without access to root the attacker cannot generally 
hide his tracks and may, at best, be able to do nothing more than mess 
with the user's files or crash the machine.  User account compromises 
are very common because users tend not to take the precautions that 
sysadmins take.

     System administrators must keep in mind that there are potentially 
many ways to break root on a machine.  The attacker may know the root 
pass word, the attacker may find a bug in a root-run server and be able 
to break root over a network connection to that server, or the 
attacker may know of a bug in an SUID-root program that allows the attacker to 
break root once he has broken into a user's account.  If an attacker has 
found a way to break root on a machine, the attacker may not have a need 
to install a backdoor.  Many of the root holes found and closed to 
date involve a considerable amount of work by the attacker to clean up 
after himself, so most attackers do install backdoors.  This gives you a 
convenient way to detect the attacker.  Making it impossible for an 
attacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental to your security
 because it will not close off the hole the attacker used to break 
in in the first place.

     Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered
     ``onion peel'' approach and can be categorized as follows:

           1.   Securing root and staff accounts

           2.   Securing root -- root-run servers and SUID/SGID binaries

           3.   Securing user accounts

           4.   Securing the password file

           5.   Securing the kernel core, raw devices, and file systems

           6.   Quick detection of inappropriate changes made to the 

           7.   Paranoia

     Do not bother securing staff accounts if you have not secured the 
root account.  Most systems have a password assigned to the root 
account.  The first thing you do is assume that the password is always 
     This does not mean that you should remove the password.  The 
password is almost always necessary for console access to the machine.  What it 
does mean is that you should not make it possible to use the password 
outside of the console or possibly even with a su(1) utility.  For example, 
make sure that your PTYs are specified as being ``unsecure'' in the 
/etc/ttys file so that direct root logins via telnet(1) or rlogin(1) are 
disallowed.  If using other login services such as sshd(8), make sure 
that direct root logins are disabled there as well.  Consider every 
access method -- services such as ftp(1) often fall through the cracks.  
     root logins should only be allowed via the system console.

     Of course, as a sysadmin you have to be able to get to root, so we 
open up a few holes.  But we make sure these holes require additional 
password verification to operate.  One way to make root accessible is to add
 appropriate staff accounts to the ``wheel'' group (in /etc/group).  
The staff members placed in the wheel group are allowed to su(1) to 
     You should never give staff members native wheel access by putting 
them in the wheel group in their password entry.  Staff accounts should 
be placed in a ``staff'' group, and then added to the wheel group via 
the /etc/group file.  Only those staff members who actually need to 
have root access should be placed in the wheel group.  It is also possible, 
when using an authentication method such as Kerberos, to use Kerberos's
 .k5login file in the root account to allow a ksu(1) to root without 
having to place anyone at all in the wheel group.  This may be the 
better solution since the wheel mechanism still allows an intruder to 
break root if the intruder has gotten hold of your password file and can break 
into a staff account.  While having the wheel mechanism is better than 
having nothing at all, it is not necessarily the safest option.

     An indirect way to secure the root account is to secure your staff
     accounts by using an alternative login access method and *'ing out 
the crypted password for the staff accounts.  This way an intruder may 
be able to steal the password file but will not be able to break into 
any staff accounts or root, even if root has a crypted password 
associated with it (assuming, of course, that you have limited root access to 
the console).  Staff members get into their staff accounts through a 
secure login mechanism such as kerberos(8) or ssh(1) using a 
private/public key pair.  When you use something like Kerberos you 
generally must secure the machines which run the Kerberos servers and your desktop 
     When you use a public/private key pair with SSH, you must generally
     secure the machine you are logging in from (typically your 
workstation), but you can also add an additional layer of protection to the key 
pair by password protecting the keypair when you create it with 
     Being able to *-out the passwords for staff accounts also 
guarantees that staff members can only log in through secure access methods that 
you have set up.  You can thus force all staff members to use secure, 
encrypted connections for all their sessions which closes an important hole 
used by many intruders: that of sniffing the network from an unrelated, 
less secure machine.

     The more indirect security mechanisms also assume that you are 
logging in from a more restrictive server to a less restrictive server.  For 
example, if your main box is running all sorts of servers, your 
workstation should not be running any.  In order for your workstation to be 
reasonably secure you should run as few servers as possible, up to and 
including no servers at all, and you should run a password-protected 
screen blanker.  Of course, given physical access to a workstation, an 
attacker can break any sort of security you put on it.  This is definitely a 
problem that you should consider but you should also consider the fact 
that the vast majority of break-ins occur remotely, over a network, from 
people who do not have physical access to your workstation or servers.

     Using something like Kerberos also gives you the ability to disable 
or change the password for a staff account in one place and have it 
immediately affect all the machines the staff member may have an account 
     If a staff member's account gets compromised, the ability to 
instantly change his password on all machines should not be underrated.  With 
discrete passwords, changing a password on N machines can be a mess.  
You can also impose re-passwording restrictions with Kerberos: not only 
can a Kerberos ticket be made to timeout after a while, but the Kerberos 
system can require that the user choose a new password after a certain 
period of time (say, once a month).

     The prudent sysadmin only runs the servers he needs to, no more, no 
     Be aware that third party servers are often the most bug-prone.  
     example, running an old version of imapd(8) or popper(8)
     (ports/mail/popper) is like giving a universal root ticket out to 
the entire world.  Never run a server that you have not checked out 
carefully.  Many servers do not need to be run as root.  For example, 
the talkd(8), comsat(8), and fingerd(8) daemons can be run in special 
user ``sandboxes''.  A sandbox is not perfect unless you go to a large 
amount of trouble, but the onion approach to security still stands: if 
someone is able to break in through a server running in a sandbox, they 
still have to break out of the sandbox.  The more layers the attacker 
must break through, the lower the likelihood of his success.  Root holes 
have historically been found in virtually every server ever run as root,
 including basic system servers.  If you are running a machine 
through which people only log in via sshd(8) and never log in via 
telnetd(8), rshd(8), or rlogind(8), then turn off those services!

     FreeBSD now defaults to running talkd(8), comsat(8), and fingerd(8) 
in a sandbox.  Another program which may be a candidate for running in a 
sandbox is named(8).  The default rc.conf includes the arguments 
necessary to run named(8) in a sandbox in a commented-out form.  Depending on 
whether you are installing a new system or upgrading an existing system, 
the special user accounts used by these sandboxes may not be installed.  
The prudent sysadmin would research and implement sandboxes for servers 
whenever possible.

     There are a number of other servers that typically do not run in 
sandboxes: sendmail(8), popper(8), imapd(8), ftpd(8), and others.  
There are alternatives to some of these, but installing them may require more 
work than you are willing to put (the convenience factor strikes again).  
You may have to run these servers as root and rely on other mechanisms 
to detect break-ins that might occur through them.

     The other big potential root hole in a system are the SUID-root and 
SGID binaries installed on the system.  Most of these binaries, such as  
rlogin(1), reside in /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, or /usr/sbin.  While nothing
 is 100% safe, the system-default SUID and SGID binaries can be 
considered reasonably safe.  Still, root holes are occasionally found in these 
binaries.  A root hole was found in Xlib in 1998 that made xterm(1)
 (ports/x11/xterm) (which is typically SUID) vulnerable.  It is 
better to be safe than sorry and the prudent sysadmin will restrict SUID 
binaries that only staff should run to a special group that only staff can 
access, and get rid of (``chmod 000'') any SUID binaries that nobody uses.  
A server with no display generally does not need an xterm(1) binary.  
binaries can be almost as dangerous.  If an intruder can break an 
kmem binary the intruder might be able to read /dev/kmem and thus 
read the crypted password file, potentially compromising any passworded
 account.  Alternatively an intruder who breaks group ``kmem'' can 
monitor keystrokes sent through PTYs, including PTYs used by users who log 
in through secure methods.  An intruder that breaks the ``tty'' group 
can write to almost any user's TTY.  If a user is running a terminal 
program or emulator with a keyboard-simulation feature, the intruder can 
potentially generate a data stream that causes the user's terminal to 
echo a command, which is then run as that user.

     User accounts are usually the most difficult to secure.  While you 
can impose draconian access restrictions on your staff and *-out their 
passwords, you may not be able to do so with any general user accounts 
you might have.  If you do have sufficient control then you may win out 
and be able to secure the user accounts properly.  If not, you simply 
have to be more vigilant in your monitoring of those accounts.  Use of SSH 
and Kerberos for user accounts is more problematic due to the extra 
administration and technical support required, but still a very good 
solution compared to a crypted password file.

     The only sure fire way is to *-out as many passwords as you can and 
use SSH or Kerberos for access to those accounts.  Even though the 
crypted password file (/etc/spwd.db) can only be read by root, it may be 
possible for an intruder to obtain read access to that file even if the 
attacker cannot obtain root-write access.

     Your security scripts should always check for and report changes to 
the password file (see CHECKING FILE INTEGRITY below).

     If an attacker breaks root he can do just about anything, but there 
are certain conveniences.  For example, most modern kernels have a 
packet sniffing device driver built in.  Under FreeBSD it is called the 
bpf(4) device.  An intruder will commonly attempt to run a packet sniffer 
on a compromised machine.  You do not need to give the intruder the 
capability and most systems should not have the bpf(4) device compiled in.

     But even if you turn off the bpf(4) device, you still have /dev/mem 
and /dev/kmem to worry about.  For that matter, the intruder can still 
write to raw disk devices.  Also, there is another kernel feature called 
the module loader, kldload(8).  An enterprising intruder can use a KLD 
module to install his own bpf(4) device or other sniffing device on a 
running kernel.  To avoid these problems you have to run the kernel at a 
higher security level, at least level 1.  The security level can be set 
with a sysctl(8) on the kern.securelevel variable.  Once you have set the 
security level to 1, write access to raw devices will be denied and 
special chflags(1) flags, such as schg, will be enforced.  You must also 
ensure that the schg flag is set on critical startup binaries, 
directories, and script files -- everything that gets run up to the point where the 
security level is set.  This might be overdoing it, and upgrading the 
system is much more difficult when you operate at a higher security level.  
You may compromise and run the system at a higher security level but 
not set the schg flag for every system file and directory under the sun.  
Another possibility is to simply mount / and /usr read-only.  It should be 
noted that being too draconian in what you attempt to protect may prevent 
the all-important detection of an intrusion.

     The kernel runs with five different security levels.  Any 
super-user process can raise the level, but no process can lower it.  The 
security  -1    Permanently insecure mode - always run the system in 
insecure mode.
           This is the default initial value.

     0     Insecure mode - immutable and append-only flags may be turned 
           All devices may be read or written subject to their 

     1     Secure mode - the system immutable and system append-only 
flags may not be turned off; disks for mounted file systems, /dev/mem 
and /dev/kmem may not be opened for writing; /dev/io (if your 
platform has it) may not be opened at all; kernel modules (see kld(4)) 
may not be loaded or unloaded.

     2     Highly secure mode - same as secure mode, plus disks may not 
be opened for writing (except by mount(2)) whether mounted or 
           This level precludes tampering with file systems by 
unmounting them, but also inhibits running newfs(8) while the system is 

           In addition, kernel time changes are restricted to less than 
or equal to one second.  Attempts to change the time by more 
than this will log the message ``Time adjustment clamped to +1 

     3     Network secure mode - same as highly secure mode, plus IP 
packet filter rules (see ipfw(8), ipfirewall(4) and pfctl(8)) cannot 
be changed and dummynet(4) or pf(4) configuration cannot be 

     The security level can be configured with variables documented in

     When it comes right down to it, you can only protect your core 
system  configuration and control files so much before the convenience 
factor rears its ugly head.  For example, using chflags(1) to set the schg 
bit on most of the files in / and /usr is probably counterproductive 
because while it may protect the files, it also closes a detection window.  
The last layer of your security onion is perhaps the most important -- 
detection.  The rest of your security is pretty much useless (or, worse,
 presents you with a false sense of safety) if you cannot detect 
potential incursions.  Half the job of the onion is to slow down the attacker
 rather than stop him in order to give the detection layer a chance 
to catch him in the act.

     The best way to detect an incursion is to look for modified, 
missing, or unexpected files.  The best way to look for modified files is from
 another (often centralized) limited-access system.  Writing your 
security scripts on the extra-secure limited-access system makes them mostly
 invisible to potential attackers, and this is important.  In order 
to take maximum advantage you generally have to give the 
limited-access box significant access to the other machines in the business, usually 
either by doing a read-only NFS export of the other machines to the 
limited-access box, or by setting up SSH keypairs to allow the limit-access 
box to SSH to the other machines.  Except for its network traffic, NFS 
is the least visible method -- allowing you to monitor the file systems on 
each client box virtually undetected.  If your limited-access server is 
connected to the client boxes through a switch, the NFS method is 
often the better choice.  If your limited-access server is connected to the 
client boxes through a hub or through several layers of routing, the NFS 
method may be too insecure (network-wise) and using SSH may be the better 
choice even with the audit-trail tracks that SSH lays.

     Once you give a limit-access box at least read access to the client 
systems it is supposed to monitor, you must write scripts to do the 
actual monitoring.  Given an NFS mount, you can write scripts out of 
simple sys-tem utilities such as find(1) and md5(1).  It is best to physically
 md5(1) the client-box files boxes at least once a day, and to test 
control files such as those found in /etc and /usr/local/etc even more
 often.  When mismatches are found relative to the base MD5 
information the limited-access machine knows is valid, it should scream at a 
sysadmin to go check it out.  A good security script will also check for 
inappropriate SUID binaries and for new or deleted files on system 
partitions such as / and /usr.
When using SSH rather than NFS, writing the security script is much more
 difficult.  You essentially have to scp(1) the scripts to the 
client box in order to run them, making them visible, and for safety you also 
need to scp(1) the binaries (such as find(1)) that those scripts use.  
The sshd(8) daemon on the client box may already be compromised.  All 
in all, using SSH may be necessary when running over unsecure links, but it 
is also a lot harder to deal with.

     A good security script will also check for changes to user and 
staff members access configuration files: .rhosts, .shosts, 
.ssh/authorized_keys and so forth, files that might fall outside the purview of the MD5 

     If you have a huge amount of user disk space it may take too long 
to run through every file on those partitions.  In this case, setting 
mount flags to disallow SUID binaries on those partitions is a good idea.  
The nosuid option (see mount(8)) is what you want to look into.  I 
would scan them anyway at least once a week, since the object of this layer is 
to detect a break-in whether or not the break-in is effective.

     Process accounting (see accton(8)) is a relatively low-overhead 
feature of the operating system which I recommend using as a post-break-in 
evaluation mechanism.  It is especially useful in tracking down how an
 intruder has actually broken into a system, assuming the file is 
still intact after the break-in occurs.

     Finally, security scripts should process the log files and the logs 
themselves should be generated in as secure a manner as possible -- 
remote syslog can be very useful.  An intruder tries to cover his tracks, 
and log files are critical to the sysadmin trying to track down the 
time and method of the initial break-in.  One way to keep a permanent record 
of the log files is to run the system console to a serial port and 
collect the information on a continuing basis through a secure machine 
monitoring the consoles.

     A little paranoia never hurts.  As a rule, a sysadmin can add any 
number of security features as long as they do not affect convenience, and 
can add security features that do affect convenience with some added 
     Even more importantly, a security administrator should mix it up a 
bit -- if you use recommendations such as those given by this manual page 
verbatim, you give away your methodologies to the prospective attacker 
who also has access to this manual page.

     This section covers Denial of Service attacks.  A DoS attack is 
typically a packet attack.  While there is not much you can do about modern 
spoofed packet attacks that saturate your network, you can generally limit 
the damage by ensuring that the attacks cannot take down your servers.

           1.   Limiting server forks

           2.   Limiting springboard attacks (ICMP response attacks, 
ping broadcast, etc.)

           3.   Kernel Route Cache

     A common DoS attack is against a forking server that attempts to 
cause the server to eat processes, file descriptors, and memory until the
 machine dies.  The inetd(8) server has several options to limit 
this sort of attack.  It should be noted that while it is possible to prevent 
a machine from going down it is not generally possible to prevent a 
service from being disrupted by the attack.  Read the inetd(8) manual page 
carefully and pay specific attention to the -c, -C, and -R options.  
     that spoofed-IP attacks will circumvent the -C option to inetd(8), 
so typically a combination of options must be used.  Some standalone 
servers have self-fork-limitation parameters.

     The sendmail(8) daemon has its -OMaxDaemonChildren option which 
tends to work much better than trying to use sendmail(8)'s load limiting 
options due to the load lag.  You should specify a MaxDaemonChildren 
parameter when you start sendmail(8) high enough to handle your expected load 
but  not so high that the computer cannot handle that number of 
sendmail's without falling on its face.  It is also prudent to run sendmail(8) 
in ``queued'' mode (-ODeliveryMode=queued) and to run the daemon 
(``sendmail -bd'') separate from the queue-runs (``sendmail -q15m'').  If you 
still want real-time delivery you can run the queue at a much lower 
interval, such as -q1m, but be sure to specify a reasonable MaxDaemonChildren
 option for that sendmail(8) to prevent cascade failures.

     The syslogd(8) daemon can be attacked directly and it is strongly 
recommended that you use the -s option whenever possible, and the -a 
option otherwise.

     You should also be fairly careful with connect-back services such 
as tcpwrapper's reverse-identd, which can be attacked directly.  You 
generally do not want to use the reverse-ident feature of tcpwrappers for 
this reason.

     It is a very good idea to protect internal services from external 
access by firewalling them off at your border routers.  The idea here is 
to prevent saturation attacks from outside your LAN, not so much to 
protect internal services from network-based root compromise.  Always 
configure an exclusive firewall, i.e., `firewall everything except ports A, 
B, C, D, and M-Z'.  This way you can firewall off all of your low ports 
except for certain specific services such as named(8) (if you are primary 
for a zone), talkd(8), sendmail(8), and other internet-accessible 
services.  If you try to configure the firewall the other way -- as an inclusive 
or permissive firewall, there is a good chance that you will forget to
  ``close'' a couple of services or that you will add a new internal 
service and forget to update the firewall.  You can still open up the 
highnumbered port range on the firewall to allow permissive-like 
operation without compromising your low ports.  Also take note that FreeBSD 
allows you to control the range of port numbers used for dynamic binding 
via the various net.inet.ip.portrange sysctl's (``sysctl net.inet.ip.portrange''), 
which can also ease the complexity of 
your firewall's configuration.  I usually use a normal first/last range 
of 4000 to 5000, and a hiport range of 49152 to 65535, then block 
everything under 4000 off in my firewall (except for certain specific 
internet-accessible ports, of course).

     Another common DoS attack is called a springboard attack -- to 
attack a server in a manner that causes the server to generate responses 
which then overload the server, the local network, or some other machine.  
The most common attack of this nature is the ICMP PING BROADCAST 
attack.  The attacker spoofs ping packets sent to your LAN's broadcast address 
with the source IP address set to the actual machine they wish to 
attack.  If your border routers are not configured to stomp on ping's to 
broadcast addresses, your LAN winds up generating sufficient responses to the
 spoofed source address to saturate the victim, especially when the
 attacker uses the same trick on several dozen broadcast addresses 
over several dozen different networks at once.  Broadcast attacks of 
over a hundred and twenty megabits have been measured.  A second common 
springboard attack is against the ICMP error reporting system.  By 
constructing packets that generate ICMP error responses, an attacker can 
saturate a server's incoming network and cause the server to saturate its 
outgoing network with ICMP responses.  This type of attack can also crash 
the server by running it out of mbuf's, especially if the server cannot 
drain the ICMP responses it generates fast enough.  The FreeBSD kernel 
has a new kernel compile option called ICMP_BANDLIM which limits the 
effectiveness of these sorts of attacks.  The last major class of 
springboard attacks is related to certain internal inetd(8) services such as 
the UDP echo service.  An attacker simply spoofs a UDP packet with the 
source address being server A's echo port, and the destination address 
being server B's echo port, where server A and B are both on your LAN.  
The two servers then bounce this one packet back and forth between each 
     The attacker can overload both servers and their LANs simply by 
injecting a few packets in this manner.  Similar problems exist with the 
internal chargen port.  A competent sysadmin will turn off all of these
 inetd(8)-internal test services.

     Spoofed packet attacks may also be used to overload the kernel 
route cache.  Refer to the net.inet.ip.rtexpire, net.inet.ip.rtminexpire, 
and net.inet.ip.rtmaxcache sysctl(8) variables.  A spoofed packet 
attack that uses a random source IP will cause the kernel to generate a 
temporary cached route in the route table, viewable with ``netstat -rna | 
fgrep W3''.  These routes typically timeout in 1600 seconds or so.  If 
the kernel detects that the cached route table has gotten too big it will 
dynamically reduce the rtexpire but will never decrease it to less than
 rtminexpire.  There are two problems: (1) The kernel does not react
 quickly enough when a lightly loaded server is suddenly attacked, 
and (2) 
The rtminexpire is not low enough for the kernel to survive a 
sustained attack.  If your servers are connected to the internet via a T3 or 
better it may be prudent to manually override both rtexpire and 
rtminexpire via sysctl(8).  Never set either parameter to zero (unless you want to 
crash the machine :-)).  Setting both parameters to 2 seconds should be 
sufficient to protect the route table from attack.

     There are a few issues with both Kerberos and SSH that need to be
  addressed if you intend to use them.  Kerberos5 is an excellent 
authentication protocol but the kerberized telnet(1) and rlogin(1) suck 
     There are bugs that make them unsuitable for dealing with binary 
     Also, by default Kerberos does not encrypt a session unless you use 
the -x option.  SSH encrypts everything by default.

     SSH works quite well in every respect except when it is set up to 
forward encryption keys.  What this means is that if you have a secure 
workstation holding keys that give you access to the rest of the system, 
and you ssh(1) to an unsecure machine, your keys become exposed.  The 
actual keys themselves are not exposed, but ssh(1) installs a forwarding port 
for the duration of your login and if an attacker has broken root on the 
unsecure machine he can utilize that port to use your keys to gain access to 
any other machine that your keys unlock.

     We recommend that you use SSH in combination with Kerberos whenever 
possible for staff logins.  SSH can be compiled with Kerberos support.  
This reduces your reliance on potentially exposable SSH keys while at 
the same time protecting passwords via Kerberos.  SSH keys should only be 
used for automated tasks from secure machines (something that Kerberos is 
unsuited to).  We also recommend that you either turn off key-forwarding in 
the SSH configuration, or that you make use of the from=IP/DOMAIN 
option that SSH allows in its authorized_keys file to make the key only usable 
to entities logging in from specific machines.

     chflags(1), find(1), md5(1), netstat(1), openssl(1), ssh(1), xdm(1)
 (ports/x11/xorg-clients), group(5), ttys(5), accton(8), init(8), 
sshd(8), sysctl(8), syslogd(8), vipw(8)

     The security manual page was originally written by Matthew Dillon 
and first appeared in FreeBSD 3.1, December 1998.

FreeBSD 7.0             September 8, 2006                   FreeBSD 7.0

Posté par cloud | permalien | dans : FreeBSD, Security

04-03-2008 13:23:29

Tuning Fluxbox

Je me suis laissé tenter par me refaire un joli Fluxbox. Voila donc ce que j'ai utilisé :
gtk-chtheme pour modifier le thème GTK. J'ai choisi MurrinaCappucino que j'ai du ajouter auparavant (a voir dans les ports).
ensuite pour fluxbox j'ai choisi le theme blackened. Il faut decompresser le tar.gz, puis copier le theme dans le rep ~/.fluxbox/styles/ et ajouter le rep pixmap/ dans le même répertoire. Il est ensuite disponible dans le menu fluxbox.
Je me suis ajouté conky aussi dont voila la conf :

#avoid flicker

double_buffer yes

#own window to run simultanious 2 or more conkys

own_window  yes

own_window_transparent no

own_window_type normal

own_window_hints undecorate,sticky,skip_taskbar,skip_pager 


draw_borders no

border_margin 1


draw_shades no


gap_x 6

gap_y 6

alignment top_left


update_interval 1


default_color  9f907d

#default_shade_color 000000

#own_window_colour 3d352a

own_window_colour 000000


use_xft yes

xftfont bauhaus:pixelsize=11

#to prevent window from moving

use_spacer no

minimum_size 1280 0


${alignc}Kernel: ${color D7D3C5}$kernel   |  ${time %d %B} ${color
D7D3C5}${time  %H:%M}  |  ${color} Up: ${color D7D3C5}${uptime_short}   |
${color}Processes: ${color D7D3C5}$processes  ${color}Running: ${color
D7D3C5}$running_processes   |  ${color}Cpu: ${color D7D3C5}${cpu}%  ${color
D7D3C5} |  ${color }Mem: ${color D7D3C5}$mem/$memmax - $memperc% ${color}
${membar 6,80}${color D7D3C5} | ${color}Net: ${color D7D3C5}${font}Down :
${downspeed sk0} Kb/s ${color} ${color D7D3C5} |    ${color D7D3C5}Up :
${upspeed sk0} Kb/s ${color}

Vous pouvez visualiser le résultat ici :

Posté par cloud | permalien | dans : FreeBSD, OpenSource